Evolutionary Successful Strategies in a Transparent iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
2019 | book part. A publication with affiliation to the University of Göttingen.
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Evolutionary Successful Strategies in a Transparent iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Unakafov, A. M.; Schultze-Gerlach, T. ; Kagan, I. ; Moeller, S.; Gail, A. ; Treue, S. & Eule, S. et al. (2019)
In:Kaufmann, P.; Castillo, P. (Eds.), Applications of Evolutionary Computation pp. 204-219. hm: Springer. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16692-2_14
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Details
- Authors
- Unakafov, Anton M.; Schultze-Gerlach, Thomas ; Kagan, Igor ; Moeller, Sebastian; Gail, Alexander ; Treue, Stefan ; Eule, Stephan; Wolf, Fred
- Editors
- Kaufmann, P.; Castillo, P.
- Abstract
- A Transparent game is a game-theoretic setting that takes action visibility into account. In each round, depending on the relative timing of their actions, players have a certain probability to see their partner’s choice before making their own decision. This probability is determined by the level of transparency. At the two extremes, a game with zero transparency is equivalent to the classical simultaneous game, and a game with maximal transparency corresponds to a sequential game. Despite the prevalence of intermediate transparency in many everyday interactions such scenarios have not been sufficiently studied. Here we consider a transparent iterated Prisoner’s dilemma (iPD) and use evolutionary simulations to investigate how and why the success of various strategies changes with the level of transparency. We demonstrate that non-zero transparency greatly reduces the set of successful memory-one strategies compared to the simultaneous iPD. For low and moderate transparency the classical “Win - Stay, Lose - Shift” (WSLS) strategy is the only evolutionary successful strategy. For high transparency all strategies are evolutionary unstable in the sense that they can be easily counteracted, and, finally, for maximal transparency a novel “Leader-Follower” strategy outperforms WSLS. Our results provide a partial explanation for the fact that the strategies proposed for the simultaneous iPD are rarely observed in nature, where high levels of transparency are common.
- Issue Date
- 2019
- Publisher
- Springer
- ISBN
- 978-3-030-16691-5
978-3-030-16692-2 - Language
- English