36 different chocolate directives: How does the setting influence negotiation outcomes and dynamics in an EU simulation?

2015 | journal article; research paper. A publication with affiliation to the University of Göttingen.

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​36 different chocolate directives: How does the setting influence negotiation outcomes and dynamics in an EU simulation?​
Fink, S. ​ (2015) 
European Political Science14 pp. 241​-253​.​ DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/eps.2015.21 

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Authors
Fink, Simon 
Abstract
The article analyses how the setting of EU simulations influences negotiation outcomes, that is, the content of the simulated directives. We have played the same simulation of the chocolate directive – the same roles and the same Commission proposal – in various settings (with different kinds of participants, various group sizes, for one or two days, with instructors or participants playing the European Parliament (EP)). A quantitative analysis elucidates relations between settings and outcomes we would not see when considering only one simulation at a time. First, the simulation scales well. Simulation duration, number and kind of participants have little impact on the range of outcomes. Second, the directive is more liberal if participants play the EP, indicating that our instructors play the EP too tough. Third, Swiss participants negotiate stricter and more consensual directives. These results can inform the further evolution of the simulation based on hard data.
Issue Date
2015
Journal
European Political Science 
Organization
Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät ; Institut für Politikwissenschaft ; Arbeitsbereich Politisches System der BRD 
ISSN
1680-4333
Language
English
Research data
https://www.dropbox.com/s/ev8wo5w0fkk73ub/Replication%20Data%20EPS.zip?dl=0

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