REACh as a paradigm shift in chemical policy – responsive regulation and behavioural models

Abstract

The European Union is changing its general approach to chemical regulation by introducing the new programme REACh, i.e. Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals. In this paper we argue that REACh is nothing less than a paradigm shift in the regulatory approach of the EU. Generally speaking, REACh places all major responsibilities with firms rather than on administrative bodies. At the same time, this policy is far from undemanding: companies marketing substances falling under REACh must ensure that along the production chain dangers to health and environment will be mastered throughout all intermediate and final users of the substance or the product containing the substance. In other words, producers of REACh chemicals must start downstream information and communication processes along the entire production chain to meet the requirements of the directive, which is stipulating both gathering the risk-related information and implementing appropriate risk-reduction measures. This paper aims to identify the major changes in the policy approach induced by REACh, and the type of behavioural model necessary to give a well-founded prognosis. In this paper we describe briefly responsive regulation as the new underlying paradigm of regulation as opposed to hierarchical regulation. From there we proceed to analyse the concept of self-responsibility in this context, and suggest adopting an agent-specific approach. In order to form expectations about the possible outcome of such regulation, behavioural models need to be well-defined for a systematic analysis of incentives imposed by REACh. We propose a behavioural model of homo oeconomicus institutionalis in order to allow cognitive limits and rule-following behaviour of individuals in complex situations. As can be seen, cognitive limits as well as rule-following behaviour are of paramount importance to highly complex regulations such as REACh. In conclusion, REACh demands not only a new paradigm of regulation, such as responsive regulation, but also a modified approach of behavioural analysis for prognosis, such as the concept of homo oeconomicus institutionalis. Further, the incentives facing agents regulated by REACh need to be analysed. Apparently, REACh does not sufficiently take into account that regulative approaches based on self-responsibility must be supported by adequate incentives, in order to reach the objectives.