A comparison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany: Experimental investigation based on the investment game
2003 | journal article
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A comparison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany: Experimental investigation based on the investment game
Willinger, M.; Keser, C. ; Lohmann, C. H. & Usunier, J.-C. (2003)
Journal of Economic Psychology, 24(4) pp. 447-466. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-4870(02)00165-4
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Details
- Authors
- Willinger, Marc; Keser, Claudia ; Lohmann, Christoph H.; Usunier, Jean-Claude
- Abstract
- We compare the results of a one-shot investment game, studied earlier by Berg et al. [Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995) 122], for France and Germany. In this game, player A is the trustor and player B the trustee. The average level of investment is significantly larger in Germany, but the level of reciprocity is not significantly different between the two countries. This implies that German B-players earned significantly more than French B-players. Furthermore, in both countries B-players earned significantly more than A-players. Our results support Fukuyama’s conjecture that the level of trust is higher in Germany than in France, a situation which can explain a higher rate of investment and a higher level of performance. However, our results also show that the increased revenue which is attributable to the higher level of trust, is not shared in a more equitable way, but essentially increases B-players’ payoffs. Finally, based on an intercultural trust experiment, we show that French A subjects did not find German B subjects less trustworthy and German A subjects did not find French B subjects less trustworthy.
- Issue Date
- 2003
- Journal
- Journal of Economic Psychology
- Language
- English