Delegation, Principal-Agent Theory and the Case of Banking Regulation

2002 | conference paper

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​Delegation, Principal-Agent Theory and the Case of Banking Regulation​
Busch, A. ​ (2002)
​New Governance of Markets: Regulation by Non-Majoritarian Institutions​, CARR / London School of Economics.

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Authors
Busch, Andreas 
Issue Date
2002
Conference
New Governance of Markets: Regulation by Non-Majoritarian Institutions
Conference Place
CARR / London School of Economics
Event start
2002-12-06
Event end
2002-12-07

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