Commentary on Kant's Treatment of Constitutional Right (Metaphysics of Morals II: General Remark A; §§51–52, Conclusion, Appendix)

Abstract

It is only in §51 of the Metaphysics of Morals, that is, in the second half of the discussion of 'Constitutional Right', that Immanuel Kant introduces a distinction that is fundamental to his exposition of the theory of the state. For here Kant distinguishes between the pure idea of a head of state, and a physical person. In expounding his theory of the political division of powers or authorities, Kant explicitly underlines the comparative and normative function that intrinsically belongs to the concept of the state in idea. In the conceptual context of the Doctrine of Right, despotism represents an explicit perversion of the state in idea insofar as it directly involves a usurpation of legislative authority by executive authority. In the historical reception of Kant's theory of constitutional law, one of the most intensely discussed topics has always been the question concerning the right to resistance or rebellion.